We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors-more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule.
INTRODUCTION
In mechanism design, often, various assumptions about the space of possible outcomes and the agents' preferences are made. For example, it is often assumed that the agents can make payments, and that their utilities are quasilinear (that is, the contribution of payment to utility is linear and independent of the outcome chosen). However, these assumptions are not always reasonable. In contrast, in a general social choice or voting setting, every agent (or voter) can rank the outcomes (or alternatives) in any possible way. A mechanism (or voting rule) takes every agent's reported ranking of the alternatives as input, and produces one of the alternatives as output.
Unfortunately, considering such an unrestricted setting comes at a price. It turns out that any reasonable voting rule is vulnerable to manipulation, that is, a voter can sometimes make herself better off by declaring her preferences insincerely. A rule that is not vulnerable to manipulation is called strategy-proof. The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem [13, 18] states that when there are three or more alternatives, there is no strategy-proof voting rule that satisfies non-imposition (for every alternative, there exist votes that would make that alternative win) and non-dictatorship (the rule does not simply always choose the most-preferred alternative of a single fixed voter). This is in sharp contrast to settings with quasilinear preferences, where, for example, VCG mechanisms [20, 6, 14] are strategy-proof.
Although a manipulation is guaranteed to exist (for reasonable rules), in order for the manipulating agent to use it, she must also be able to find it. Recent research has studied whether finding a manipulation can be made computationally hard, thereby erecting a computational barrier against manipulation. A number of results have been obtained that show that finding a successful manipulation is NP-hard [3, 2, 7, 11, 9, 15] . Some of these results consider manipulation by an individual voter, whereas others consider the more general case of manipulation by a coalition of voters.
However, all of these hardness results are worst-case results. That is, they suggest that any algorithm will require superpolynomial time to solve some instances. However, this does not mean that there is no efficient algorithm that can find a manipulation for most instances. Several recent results seem to suggest that indeed, in various senses, hard instances of the manipulation problem are the exception rather than the rule [17, 8, 16, 21] .
The results in this paper add to the body of work that suggests that the manipulation problem is usually easy to solve. For a very large class of voting rules, we show that in most cases, as the number of voters gets large, either the probability that the manipulators can change the outcome is very small, or the probability that they can (easily) make any alternative win is very large. Which of these two cases holds depends on the relative size of the coalition of ma-nipulators, and there is a small boundary between these two cases for which we have no result, when the size of the manipulating coalition is on the order of √ n, where n is the total number of voters. Hence, for almost all cases, a simple inspection of relative size of the manipulating coalition suffices to decide the manipulation problem (and finding the actual manipulation is not hard).
More specifically, given the nonmanipulators' votes, there is some set of alternatives that can still win. That is, an alternative c is a possible winner with respect to a given set of (nonmanipulators') votes and some set of manipulators if there exist votes for the manipulators that make c win. In this paper, we consider a setting in which the nonmanipulators' votes are drawn at random, and we are interested in how large the set of possible winners is. What is the probability that the manipulators cannot change the outcome (there is only one possible winner)? What is the probability that the manipulators can make any alternative win (all alternatives are possible winners)? For a very general class of voting rules, we will show conditions under which the former probability is high, and conditions under which the latter probability is high. Under the latter set of conditions, we also show how the manipulators can make any alternative win (with a high probability).
These results are very similar to the results by Proacaccia and Rosenschein [16] , but our results are significantly more general. Specifically, Proacaccia and Rosenschein only show their result for positional scoring rules (which we will define shortly). They also mention without proof that they can extend the results to the Copeland and maximin rules, and they conjecture that the results can be extended to other rules as well. Our results serve to prove this informal conjecture: we introduce a new class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules, and we prove the results for this class of rules. This class is extremely general: we are not aware of any commonly studied voting rule that cannot be expressed as a generalized scoring rule.
While we feel that our main contribution is to introduce the class of generalized scoring rules and prove the results for these rules, we also characterize the probability of manipulability more precisely rather than saying it converges to 1 or 0.
1 This characterization constitutes a general version of various results on the probability that an election ends up (roughly) in a tie, that is, a single voter can change the winner; this probability is also called the voting power [4, 12] . Knowing this probability is also interesting from the perspective of a voter who is determining her incentive to vote. Again, all of the existing results consider only the much smaller class of positional scoring rules. Specifically, Baharad and Neeman [1] showed that under some local correlation conditions, when the number of manipulators is no more than a constant, the probability that manipulation can be done is O(
where n is the number of voters, under any positional scoring rule. Slinko [19] showed that under a particular condition on the probability distribution, under any faithful positional scoring rule (that is, all the scores in the scoring vector are different) the ratio of the number of manipulable profiles to the number of all profiles is O(
, where k is the number of manipulators.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. After covering some preliminaries in Section 2, in Section 3, we introduce generalized scoring rules, in which every vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors-more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule. In the subsequent sections, we study the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. In Section 4 we prove that under certain natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is O(n p ) (for any p < 1 2 ), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable is O(n p− 1 2 ), where n is the number of voters. In Section 5, we prove that, under another set of natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is Ω(n p ) (for any 1 2 < p < 1) and o(n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable (to any possible winning alternative under the rule) is 1 − O(e −Ω(n 2p−1 ) ). Finally, in Section 6, we show how these results apply to any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs, under the uniform distribution over votes.
PRELIMINARIES
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of alternatives (or candidates). A linear order on C is a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation on C. The set of all linear orders on C is denoted by L(C). An n-voter profile P on C consists of n linear orders on C. That is, P = (V1, . . . , Vn), where for every i ≤ n, Vi ∈ L(C). The set of all profiles on C is denoted by P (C). In the remainder of the paper, m denotes the number of alternatives and n denotes the number of voters. A voting rule r is a function from the set of all profiles on C to C, that is, r : P (C) → C. The following are some common voting rules. 2. Copeland: For any two alternatives ci and cj , we can simulate a pairwise election between them, by seeing how many votes prefer ci to cj , and how many prefer cj to ci. Then, an alternative receives one point for each win in a pairwise election. Typically, an alternative also receives half a point for each pairwise tie. The winner is the alternative who has the highest score.
3. STV: The election has |C| rounds. In each round, the alternative that gets the minimal plurality score drops out, and is removed from all of the votes (so that votes for this alternative transfer to another alternative in the next round). The last-remaining alternative is the winner.
4. Maximin: Let N (ci, cj ) denote the number of votes that rank ci ahead of cj . The winner is the alternative c that maximizes min{N (c, c ) : c ∈ C, c = c}.
Ranked pairs:
This rule first creates an entire ranking of all the alternatives. N (ci, cj ) is defined as for the maximin rule. In each step, we will consider a pair of alternatives ci, cj that we have not previously considered; specifically, we choose the remaining pair with the highest N (ci, cj ). We then fix the order ci > cj, unless this contradicts previous orders that we fixed (that is, it violates transitivity). We continue until we have considered all pairs of alternatives (hence we have a full ranking). The alternative at the top of the ranking wins.
In this paper, a manipulation instance is defined as follows. 
GENERALIZED SCORING RULES
In this section, we define an extremely general class of voting rules that we call generalized scoring rules. This is the class for which we will prove our results. We do not know of any example of a commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule. A generalized scoring rule associates a vector of k real numbers with every vote, for some k that depends on (but is not necessarily equal to) m. The decision that the rule makes is based only on the sum of these vectors. Even more specifically, the decision is based only on comparisons among the components in this sum. That is, if we know, for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, whether the ith component in the sum is larger than the jth component, the jth is larger than the ith, or they are the same, then we know enough to determine the winner. Sometimes, the components can be partitioned so that the decision only depends on comparisons within elements of the partition, which will be helpful.
Unweighted generalized scoring rules
Let k ∈ N, and let K = {K1, . . . , Kq} be a partition of K = {1, . . . , k}. That is, for any i ≤ q, Ki ⊆ K, K = ∪ q l=1 K l , and for any i, j ≤ q, i = j, Ki∩Kj = ∅. We say that two vectors of length k are equivalent with respect to a partition if, within each element of the partition, they agree on which components are larger. 
Definition 2 Let
That is, K is obtained from K by partitioning the sets in K . In this case, we say that K is coarser than K , and K is finer than K .
Proposition 1 For any partitions
We note that {K} (the partition that only contains K itself) is the coarsest partition.
That is, for any mapping g that is compatible with K , g(a) is determined (only) by comparisons within each K l , l ≤ q. Namely, we do not need to compare components across different elements of the partition. Now we are ready to define generalized scoring rules.
) is of order k, and compatible with K .
The weighted version of generalized scoring rules is defined in Appendix 2. Below, unless otherwise specified, generalized scoring rules refer to unweighted generalized scoring rules. From Proposition 1 we know that for any partitions
) is also compatible with K . Given a profile P of votes, we use f (P ) as shorthand for V ∈P f (V ). We will call f (P ) the total generalized score vector. By definition, any unweighted generalized scoring rule satisfies anonymity (that is, every voter is treated equally) and homogeneity (that is, if we add any number of copies of the profile to the profile, the winner does not change). Any generalized scoring rule is compatible with the partition {K}. Nevertheless, being compatible with {K} is not vacuous: if we modified the definition so that g is not required to be compatible with any partition, then any anonymous voting rule would belong to the resulting class of rules. If a generalized scoring rule is compatible with a partition, this effectively means that, within each element of the partition, the scores are of the same "type," so that we can compare them.
We now illustrate how general the class of generalized scoring rules is by showing how some standard rules belong to the class. Many other rules can also be shown to belong to the class.
Proposition 2 All positional scoring rules, Copeland, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs are generalized scoring rules.

Proof of Proposition 2:
We explicitly give k, f, g, K for each of these rules. In the remainder of the proof, the number of alternatives is fixed to be m. Let V ∈ L(C) be a vote, and let P be a profile of votes. Because it is ambiguous how ties should be broken for the rules in the proposition, we will also not specify how ties are broken when we describe these rules as generalized scoring rules.
• Positional scoring rules: Suppose the scoring vector for the rule is v = (v (1), . . . , v(m)). The total generalized score vector will simply consist of the total scores of the individual alternatives. Let
• Copeland: For Copeland, the total generalized score vector will consist of the scores in the pairwise elections. Let -k Copeland = m(m − 1); the components are indexed by pairs
, then add 1 point to j's Copeland score; if tied, then add 0.5 to both i's and j's Copeland scores. The winner is the alternative that gets the highest Copeland score.
(we recall that q is the number of elements in the partition). The elements of the partition are indexed
• STV: For STV, we will use a total generalized score vector with many components. For every proper subset S of alternatives, for every alternative c outside of S, there is a component in the vector that contains the number of times that c is ranked first if all of the alternatives in S are removed. Let
(m − i); the components are indexed by (S, j), where S is a proper subset of C and j ≤ m, cj / ∈ S. -(fSTV (V )) (S,j) = 1, if after removing S from V , cj is at the top; otherwise, let (fSTV (V )) (S,j) = 0.
-gSTV selects the winner based on fSTV (P ) as follows. In the first round, find j1 = arg minj ((fSTV (P )) (∅,j) ). Let S1 = {cj 1 }. Then, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, define Si recursively as follows: Si = Si−1 ∪ {ji}, where ji = arg minj (fSTV (P ) (S i−1 ,j) ); finally, the winner is the unique alternative in C − Sm−1.
The elements of the partition are indexed by
• Maximin: For maximin, we use the same total generalized score vector as for Copeland, that is, the vector of all scores in pairwise elections. Let -kmaximin = m(m − 1); the components are indexed by pairs
• Ranked pairs: We use the same total generalized score vector as for Copeland and maximin, that is, the vector of all scores in pairwise elections. Let -krp = m(m − 1); the components are indexed by pairs (i, j)
0 otherwise -grp selects the winner based on frp(P ) as follows. In each step, we consider a pair of alternatives ci, cj that we have not previously considered; specifically, we choose the remaining pair with the highest (frp(P )) (i,j) . We then fix the order ci > cj , unless this contradicts previous orders that we fixed (that is, it violates transitivity). We continue until we have considered all pairs of alternatives. The alternative at the top of the ranking wins.
2 We showed that STV, also known as instant run-off voting, is a generalized scoring rule. In Appendix 1, we generalize this and show that any multiround run-off process where in each round, alternatives are eliminated according to a generalized scoring rule (to be precise, a correspondence) must itself be a generalized scoring rule. (For STV, a version of plurality that just eliminates one alternative is used in every round.)
We stress that the class of generalized scoring rules is not equal to the class of anonymous voting rules. To see this, we recall that any generalized scoring rule satisfies homogeneity. The next example shows an anonymous voting rule that does not satisfy homogeneity.
Example 1 Let r be the voting rule that selects an alternative c if the number of times that c is ranked at the top is higher than that of any other alternative by at least 2; if no such alternative exits, then the first (default) alternative c1 is selected.
r is anonymous. We note that r(c2 c1) = c1 and r(2(c2 c1)) = c2. Hence, r does not satisfy homogeneity.
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH COALI-TIONAL MANIPULABILITY IS RARE
Let π be a probability distribution over L(C) that is positive everywhere. Let φπ,n be the distribution over profiles of n voters in which each vote is drawn i.i.d. according to π. Given a manipulation instance (r, P NM , |M |), if there is only one possible winner, then we say that this manipulation instance is closed; otherwise we say this manipulation instance is open [16] .
. An instance is open if it is not closed.
Procaccia and Rosenschein [16] have shown that if 1. the rule is a positional scoring rule, 2. the number of manipulators |M | is o( √ n), 3. the votes are drawn independently, and 4. there exists d > 0 such that for each vote's distribution, the variance of the difference in scores for any pair of alternatives is at least d, then when n → ∞, the probability that a weighted manipulation instance is open is 0. In this section, we generalize this result to generalized scoring rules; in addition, we characterize the rate of convergence to 0. (However, unlike Procaccia and Rosenschein, we do assume that votes are drawn i.i.d.; this is needed to obtain the convergence rate. Hence, strictly speaking, our result is not a generalization of their result. We can also obtain a strict generalization of Procaccia and Rosenschein's results to generalized scoring rules, but without proving a convergence rate; we will not do so in this paper.)
Specifically, in this section, we study the probability that a manipulation instance is open when there are O(n p ) (0 ≤ p < 1 2 ) manipulators, and the nonmanipulator votes are drawn i.i.d. Here, n is the total number of voters, |NM| + |M | (nonmanipulators and manipulators). We will prove that for any generalized scoring rule, this probability is O(
that does not depend on N , and any function f (N ) that is Ω (1),
Proof of Lemma 1: Let Φ(x) be the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
. Then we have:
Then by the Berry-Esséen theorem [10] ,
, because C is a constant that does not depend on N and f (N ) = Ω(1).
2 
Proof of Theorem 1: We recall that each vote is drawn i.i.d. according to the probabilistic distribution π. For any pair i1, i2 ≤ k, i1 = j2, and any t > 0, let
We recall that (f (P NM ))i is the ith component of f (P NM ). In other words, R(i1, i2, t, π, |NM|) is the probability of profiles of 
That is, vmax is the maximum component of all score vectors corresponding to a single vote. We note that vmax is a constant that does not depend on n. We also note that since |M | is O(n p ) and p < 1 2 , it must be that |NM| is Ω(n), so that n is O(|NM|), vmaxhn p is O(|NM| p ). Therefore, by Lemma 1 (in which we let N = |NM|), we know that 
. Therefore, we have
tmax. We know that t m,p,h is a constant that does not depend on n.
(End of the proof of Theorem 1.) 2 From Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, we obtain the following corollary. 
, and any constant h (where m, p, and h do not depend on n), there exists a constant t m,p,h > 0 (that does not depend on
A profile is said to be tied if a single additional voter can change the outcome. By letting p = 0 and h = 1 in Theorem 1, we have that for any generalized scoring rule and any fixed m, the number of tied profiles is O(
). We note that Theorem 1 does not apply to all anonymous voting rules. For example, let us consider the voting rule r that selects the first candidate, c1, if the number of times it is ranked at the top is even; otherwise, the rule selects the second candidate, c2. For this rule, even when there is only one manipulator, any profile P NM for the non-manipulators is open, because the manipulator can always determine whether the number of times that c1 is ranked at the top in the complete profile (that is, the profile that includes both the non-manipulators and the manipulator) is odd or even, by casting a vote that either ranks c1 at the top or not.
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH COALI-TIONS OF MANIPULATORS ARE ALL-POWERFUL
Let us consider a positional scoring rule and a distribution over nonmanipulator votes. Furthermore, let us consider each alternative's expected score; let Cmax be the set of alternatives with the highest expected score. Procaccia and Rosenschein [16] have shown that if 1. the number of manipulators is in both ω( √ n) and o(n), and 2. votes are drawn i.i.d., then, the probability that the manipulators can make any alternative in Cmax win converges to 1 as n → ∞. Hence, assuming |Cmax| > 1, the probability that the instance is open converges to 1 (however, if |Cmax| = 1, it converges to 0).
In this section, we prove a similar result for generalized scoring rules; in addition, we characterize the rate of convergence to 0. (In fact, in this case, Procaccia and Rosenschein also characterize this rate-for positional scoring rules.) Specifically, in this section, we study the case where the number of manipulators is Ω(n p ) ( 
Definition 6 π is compatible with K w.r.t. f , if, for V ∼ π, for any l ≤ q, any i, j ∈ K l (i = j), E((f (V ))i) = E((f (V ))j).
That is, π is compatible with K w.r.t. f if within each element of the partition K , the expectation of the components of f (V ) are the same (where V is drawn according to π).
Given GS(f, g), it will be useful to have a profile P such that for some partition K that GS(f, g) is compatible with, the components of f (P ) within each K l (l ≤ q) are all different. The next definition makes this precise.
Definition 7 For any GS(f, g) compatible with K , a profile P is said to be distinctive w.r.t. GS(f, g) and K if for any
The next definition concerns the set of alternatives that can be made to win using a distinctive profile.
Definition 8 For any GS(f, g) compatible with
) be a subset of the alternatives defined as follows.
r.t GS(f, g) and K }
For any profile P M of manipulators and any alternative c, we define T (m, n, π, c, P
That is, given a profile of votes P M of the manipulators, T (m, n, π, c, P M ) is the probability that the winner of the profile P M ∪ P NM is c, when the number of alternatives is m, the number of voters is n, and the nonmanipulators' votes P NM are drawn i.i.d. according to π. Now we are ready to present the theorem. 
Theorem 2 Let GS(f, g) be a generalized scoring rule that is compatible with
That is, dmin is the minimal difference between any two components within the same element of K of f (P * c ), taken over all c ∈ W K (f, g). Since |W K (f, g)| < m (which does not depend on n), and P * c is distinctive, we know that dmin > 0 and does not depend on n. Let pmax = maxc∈C |P * c |. That is, for all c ∈ W K (f, g), the number of votes in P * c is no more than pmax. We note that pmax does not depend on n.
For any c ∈ C, define a profile of the manipulator votes P The next claim provides a lower bound on the difference between any two components of f (P M c ).
Claim 1 There exists a constant dc that does not depend on n such that the minimum difference between components of f (P
M c ) is at least dcn p , when n → ∞.
Proof of Claim 1:
Since the minimal difference between any two components of P * c is at least dmin, the minimal difference between any two components of
We note that the number of arbitrarily assigned votes in P M c is no more than |P * c |, and the difference between any two components in a vote is no more than vmax. Therefore the minimal difference between any two components of
which is Ω(n p ) because pmax, dmin, and vmax are constants that do not depend on n, and |M | is Ω(n p ). Therefore, there exists a dc that does not depend on n such that the minimal difference between any two components of f (P M c ) is at least dcn p , when n → ∞. (End of the proof of Claim 1.) 2 The next lemma is known as Chernoff's inequality [5] .
Lemma 2 (Chernoff's inequality)
For any profile P NM for the nonmanipulators, any i1, i2
The next claim states that if each vote of P NM is drawn i.i.d. according to π K , then for any different i1, i2 within the same element K l of the partition K , the probability that the difference between the i1th and the i2th component of f (P NM ) is larger than
Claim 2 For any l ≤ q and any
i1, i2 ∈ K l (i1 = i2), there exists a constant dc,i 1 ,i 2 > 0 that does not depend on n such that P r(D(P NM , i1, i2) > dcn p ) ≤ 2e −d c,i 1 ,i 2 n 2p−1
Proof of Claim 2: Let
is the same as the
. We note that σi 1 ,i 2 does not depend on n. If σ
, and for sufficiently large n we have
|NM| ≤ n
We note that
is a constant that does not depend on n.
Then uc > 0 and is a constant (that does not depend on n). We note that for any
p . Therefore, we can bound the probability of
) below as follows.
When n is sufficiently large,
. Therefore, we know that there exists a constant tc > 0 (that does not depend on n)
(End of the proof of Theorem 2.) 2
ALL-POWERFUL MANIPULATORS IN COMMON RULES
We already showed how Theorem 1, which states a condition under which manipulability is rare, can be applied to common voting rules in Corollary 1. We have not yet done so for Theorem 2; we will do so in this section. Specifically, we prove that if the number of alternatives is fixed, then for any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, ranked pairs, and maximin, if the number of ma-
) and o(n), and the nonmanipulators' votes are drawn i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution, then for any alternative c, there exists a coalitional manipulation that will make c win with a probability of 1 − O(e −Ω(n 2p−1 ) ).
The next theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for W K (f, g) to be nonempty.
Theorem 3 Let G(f, g) be compatible with
K . W K (f, g) = ∅ if and only if for any l ≤ q, any i, j ∈ K l , i = j, there exists a vote V ∈ L(C) such that (f (V ))i = (f (V ))j .
Proof of Theorem 3:
First we prove the "if" part. Suppose that for any l ≤ q,
That is, h l,max is the maximum difference between any two components within K l , for any f (V ); h l,min is the minimum positive difference between any two components within K l , for any f (V ). Then, for any l ≤ q, h l,max ≥ h l,min > 0. Let h be a natural number such that for any l ≤ q, h >
Ls. We now show that P is distinctive w.r.t. GS(f, g) and K .
For any l ≤ q, any i, j ∈ K l , let t be the minimum natural number such that (f (Lt
The last inequality holds because h > h l,max h l,min + 1. Therefore, we know that for any l ≤ q, any i, j ∈ K l , i = j, (f (P ))i = (f (P ))j. Hence, P is distinctive w.r.t. GS(f, g) and K , completing the proof of the "if" part. Now we prove the "only if part. Suppose there exist l ≤ q, i, j ∈ K l such that for any V ∈ L(C), (f (V ))i = (f (V ))j . Then, for any profile P , (f (P ))i = (f (P ))j, which means that P is not distinctive w.r.t. GS(f, g) and K . Therefore W K (f, g) = ∅, completing the proof of the "only if" part.
(End of the proof of Theorem 3.) 2 Now we show how the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied for any positional scoring rule, STV, Copeland, maximin, and ranked pairs, when the nonmanipulator votes are drawn from the uniform distribution. . Now we show, for any two given components (that lie within the same element of the partition), the vote that makes these two components different. When r is a positional scoring rule with scoring vector v: for any i, j ≤ m, i = j, let V be the vote that ranks ci at the top and cj at the bottom; then,
Proposition 3 Let
Copeland, maximin, or ranked pairs: for any i1, i2 ≤ m, j1, j2 ≤ m, i1 = j1, i2 = j2, and (i1, j1) = (i2, j2), let V be any vote in which ci 1 V cj 1 and cj 2 V ci 2 . Because (i1, j1) = (i2, j2), such a V exists. Then,
STV: for any S ⊂ C, j1 = j2 such that cj 1 / ∈ S, cj 2 / ∈ S, let V be the vote in which cj 1 is at the top. Then (fSTV (V )) (S,j 1 ) = 1 = 0 = (fSTV (V )) (S,j 2 ) .
(End of the proof of Proposition 3.) 2 By combining Proposition 3 and Theorem 3, we know that for any of the rules in Proposition 3, there exists a distinctive profile; hence, W Kr (f, g) is nonempty (some alternative will win under the distinctive profile, without any tie). Also, all of these rules are neutral (they treat every alternative in the same way) when restricted to profiles that do not cause a tie, so if W Kr (f, g) is nonempty, it must be that W Kr (f, g) = C. 
Corollary 2 Let πu be the uniform distribution over L(C)
.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced generalized scoring rules. All of the common voting rules we know are generalized scoring rules. We studied the coalitional manipulation problem under generalized scoring rules, and we proved that when the number of manipulators is small (O(n p ), p < , and o(n)), and the votes are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution satisfying some natural assumptions with respect to the rule, then with a probability of 1 − O(e −Ω(n 2p−1 ) ), the manipulators can make any alternative win (assuming that it is possible for the alternative to win under the rule). To show that the assumptions used in the results are natural, we proved that they are satisfied by any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs under the uniform distribution over votes.
While in this paper, we have focused on the frequency of coalitional manipulability, generalized scoring rules offer a general framework within which to study common voting rules. The idea of generalized scoring can be easily extended to social welfare functions (for example, the Kemeny and Slater social welfare functions). We pointed out that the class of generalized scoring rules is not equal to the class of anonymous voting rules; we believe that we know how to show that it is not equal to the class of anonymous voting rules that also satisfy homogeneity. Finding alternative characterizations of the class of generalized scoring rules is an exciting direction for future research.
We can also extend the definition of weighted generalized scoring rules so that voters are allowed to divide their votes into fractions, that is, submit fractional votes. In such a setting, each voter submits a convex combination of linear orders (that is, an element of Conv(L(C)). Such a vote Vi is given as Vi
. . , Vn) be a profile of fractional votes. We define
We let GS(w, f, g)(P ) = g(fw(P )). Now, in contrast to the previous result, we show that if voters are allowed to submit fractional votes, then (under an assumption) a weighted generalized scoring rule is anonymous if and only if all the weights are the same. 
Proof of Theorem 6:
The "if" part is obvious. We now prove the "only if" part. Suppose there exist i1, i2 ≤ n such that
that is, ws is the sum of all weights. The next claim states that the set of sums of weighted score vectors that can be obtained by a fractional profile is exactly the convex hull of f (L(C)) multiplied by ws.
) by a factor of ws.
Proof of Claim 3:
n , let P = (V1, . . . , Vn) and Vi = (End of the proof of Theorem 6.) 2
